We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging the participants in a set of j given losing coalitions into a set of j winning coalitions. We also look at the problem of turning winning coalitions into losing coalitions. We analyze the problem when the simple game is represented by a list of wining, losing, minimal winning or maximal loosing coalitions.
Introduction
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. In these systems, each voter responds with a vote of yea and nay. Democratic societies and international organizations use a wide variety of complex rules to reach decisions. Examples, where it is not always easy to understand the consequences of the way voting is done, include the Electoral College to elect the President of the United States, the United Nations Security Council, the governance structure of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union Council of Ministers, the national governments of many countries, the councils in several counties, and the system to elect the major in cities or villages of many countries. Another source of examples comes from economic enterprises whose owners are shareholders of the society and divide profits or losses proportionally to the numbers of stocks they posses, but make decisions by voting according to a pre-defined rule (i.e., an absolute majority rule or a qualified majority rule). See [11, 12] for a thorough presentation of theses and other examples. Such systems have been analyzed as simple games. Definition 1.1. A simple game Γ is a pair (N, W) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and W is a collection of subsets of N that satisfies: (1) N ∈ W, (2) ∅ / ∈ W and (3) the monotonicity property: S ∈ W and S ⊆ T ⊆ N implies T ∈ W.
The subsets of N are called coalitions, the coalitions in W are called winning coalitions, and the coalitions that are not winning are called losing coalitions (noted by L). Moreover, we say that a coalition is minimal winning (maximal losing) if it is a winning (losing) coalition all of whose proper subsets (supersets) are losing (winning). Because of monotonicity, any simple game is completely determined by its set of minimal winning (maximal losing) coalitions denoted by W m (L M ). Note that a description of a simple game Γ can be given by (N, X ), where X is W, L, W m or L M , see [12] . We focus on the process of exchanging or trading where a motivating example is the following: The considered property is the so called j-trade property for simple games. Loosely speaking, a simple game is j-trade if it is possible to rearrange the players in a set of j winning (losing) coalitions into a set of j losing (winning) coalitions, in such a way that the total number of occurrences of each player is the same in both sets. Thus, it is possible to go from one set to the other via participant trades. This notion was introduced by Taylor and Zwicker [12] in order to obtain a characterization of the weighted games, a subfamily of simple games. Recall that any simple game can be expressed as the intersection of weighted simple games. This leads to the definition of the dimension concept, the minimum number of required weighted games whose intersection represents the simple game [2, 6, 3] . Due to this fact, the problem of deciding whether a simple game is weighted has been of interest in several contexts. With respect to tradeness, it is known that a simple game is weighted if and only if it is not j-trade for any non-negative integer j [12] . Freixas et al. [5] studied the computational complexity of deciding whether a simple game is weighted among other decision problems for simple games. In particular, they showed that deciding whether a simple game is weighted is polynomial time solvable when the game is given by an explicit listing of one of the families W, L, W m , L M . On the other hand, the j-trade concept was also redefined as j-invariant-trade of simple games [4] and extended as (j, k)-simple games [7] .
Here we provide a definition of j-trade that uses a formalism that differ from the classic one for j-trade robustness applied to a simple game (see [1, 12, 4] ) in order to ease the proofs of our new results. Definition 1.3. Given a simple game Γ, a j-trade application is a set of 2j coalitions (S 1 , . . . , S 2j ) such that ∃I ⊆ {1, . . . , 2j} that satisfies:
-trade because it admits a 2-trade application. For instance, we can consider the following set of coalitions
Example 1.6. It is easy to generate a simple game that will be 2j-trade, for an integer j. For instance, we can take the simple game (N, W m ) where
are losing. Thus, the set of 2j coalitions
Before formally defining the decision problems we focus on, we consider two functions α and β associating games with various types of sets of coalitions. The allowed types are the following α(Γ) ∈ {W, L, W m , L M } and β(Γ) ∈ {W, L}, respectively. Moreover, given the β application we consider the function β that provides the complementary type with respect to the function β.
Now we can state the definition of the considered computational problems, observe that the value of α provides the type of coalitions used in the representation of the input game while the β function indicates the type of the coalitions to be exchanged.
Input: A simple game Γ given by (N, α(Γ)) and j coalitions S 1 , . . . , S j ∈ β(Γ).
Question: Do there exist S j+1 , . . . , S 2j ∈ β(Γ) such that (S 1 , . . . , S 2j ) is a j-trade application? In the remaining part of the paper we analyze the computational complexity of the above problems. Table 1 Proof. We analyze each case separately. Let S 1 , S 2 be two coalitions and assume that both are of type β(Γ) = L.
• Case α(Γ) = W. Observe that we only need to check whether there are two coalitions S 3 , S 4 ∈ W such that (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ) is a 2-trade application. This property can be trivially checked in polynomial time by considering all the pairs of coalitions in W. Therefore in polynomial time with respect to the input size.
• Case α(Γ) = W m . The algorithm is the following. First, we look for the existence of two coalitions S 3 , S 4 ∈ W m such that, ∀p ∈ N , |{i ∈ {3, 4} : p ∈ S i }| ≤ |{i ∈ {1, 2} : p ∈ S i }|. Observe that if such a pair of coalitions exists we can add the missing players (if any) in such a way that, ∀p ∈ N , |{i ∈ {3, 4} : p ∈ S i }| = |{i ∈ {1, 2} : p ∈ S i }| and obtain a 2-trade application.
• Case α(Γ) = L. Now we compute W m from L using the polynomial time algorithm shown in [5] and reduce the problem to the previous case.
The same result can be proven when β(Γ) = W. Proof. Arguments are symmetric to Proposition 2.1. Let S 1 , S 2 be two coalitions and assume that both are of type β(Γ) = W.
• Case α(Γ) = L. Here it is enough to check all pairs of losing coalitions. The reasoning is symmetric to the first case of Proposition 2.1.
The algorithm is symmetric to the second case of Proposition 2.1. We check whether there are two maximal loosing coalitions S 3 and S 4 so that, ∀p ∈ N , |{i ∈ {3, 4} : p ∈ S i }| ≥ |{i ∈ {1, 2} : p ∈ S i }|. If this is the case, by removing the additional players we get a 2-trade application.
• If α(Γ) = W, we compute L M from W using the polynomial time algorithm given in [5] and use the algorithm for the previous case.
In the following results we isolate the types giving rise to computationally hard cases. Proof. The considered (α, β)-Trade problem is easily seen to be a member of NP. We show that it is also NP-hard providing a reduction from the SAT problem. Recall that the SAT asks whether a given boolean formula φ given in conjunctive normal form is satisfiable or not. The SAT problem is a famous NP-complete problem [8] . We let X = {x 1 , ¬x 1 , x 2 , ¬x 2 , . . . , x n , ¬x n } be the literals of φ and let X i be the set of literals in the i'th clause of φ. Let m denote the number of clauses of φ. Our reduction transforms φ into an equivalent instance of the considered (α, β)-Trade problem in polynomial time.
The set of players of the associated game Γ = Γ(φ) contains the literals and two extra players a and b: N = X ∪ {a, b}. A set of players Y can win if and only if at least one of the following two conditions are met:
It is not hard to see that this is indeed a simple game since any superset of a winning set is also winning. We now have to show how to construct the set of maximal loosing coalitions L M for this game in polynomial time. A set of players S is loosing if and only if (1) and (2) are both violated. This happens if and only if at least one of the following four conditions are met:
If we consider all possible combinations of i and j then the sets on the right hand side of these expressions form a set of loosing sets. Any loosing set is contained in at least one of those sets. If we pick the maximal sets of this family -which can be done in polynomial time -we get L M for the game Γ. The sets S 1 and S 2 are constructed as follows: S 1 = {a, b} and S 2 = X. Now assume that φ is a yes-instance to SAT. Let S 3 be the set formed by the player a and all literals corresponding to a truth-assignment satisfying φ and let S 4 be the set formed by the remaining literals and the player b. It is easy to see that coalitions (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ) are a 2-trade application of Γ, where
On the other hand, note that such 2-trade application only exists if one of the winning sets contain a and a set of literals defining a truth-assignment satisfying φ. Thus, the instances to the SAT-problem and the considered (α, β)-Trade problem are equivalent.
Using a symmetric construction to the previous one we have. We conclude this section by isolating a parameter for which one of the hard cases is fixed parameter tractable. We do so by providing a parameterized reduction to the SetSplitting problem. Proof. Recall that according to [8] the SetSplitting problem is the following decision problem: Given a family F of subsets of a finite set U and an integer k, decide whether there exists a partition of U into two subsets U 1 and U 2 such that at least k elements of F are split by this partition. Lokshtanov and Saurabh [9] show that the SetSplitting problem is fixed parameter tractable when the parameter is the integer k. Now we provide a fixed parameter reduction from our case of the (α, β)-Trade problem to the SetSplitting problem.
Given a simple game (N, L M ) and Next we present a similar result but for the case in which the game is given by Γ = (N, L). Proof. The argument is quite similar to the one used in the proof of Proposition 2.3, but considering that the set of players of the game Γ contains the literals and 2+2·(j −2) extra players, i.e., a, b, and c 1i and c 2i for i ∈ {3, . . . , j}. Thus, we have that N = X ∪ {a, b} ∪ 
As winning coalitions we have S j+1 = {a, all true literals corresponding to a truth-assignment satisfying φ}, S j+2 = {b, the remaining literals that are not in S 1 }, S j+i = {c 1i , c 2i } , ∀i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , j}.
Finally, as losing coalitions we distinguish two cases:
• If j is even,
• If j is odd 5, 7 , . . . , j − 1} S i = {c 2,i−1 , c 2i } , ∀i ∈ {4, 6, 8, . . . , j − 2} S 2j = {b, c 2j } .
Related Remaining Problems
In this paper we have focused on the computational complexity of trade robustness problems for simple games. Our results are summarized in Table 1 We recall that a simple game is weighted if and only if it is j-trade robust for any non-negative integer j, see the characterization given by Taylor and Zwicker [12] . This leads us to the following problem Trade robustness problem.
Input: A simple game Γ and a non-negative integer j.
Question: Is Γ a j-trade robust game?
Whose computational complexity remains open for the different forms of representations of simple games considered in this paper.
In a recent paper Molinero et al. [10] introduced influence games. Influence games provide a succinct form of representation for simple games based on graphs. It would be of interest to analyze the complexity of the (α, β, j)-trade and the trade robustness problems when the simple game is given as an influence game.
